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Abstract 5 
In an attempt to enhance the trustworthiness of contractors and reduce corruption, the 6 
China Government has launched a construction contractor credit scoring (CCCS) scheme in 7 
Beijing for evaluating the compliance and integrity of contractors registered in the construction 8 
market. The contribution of this paper to the Body of Knowledge is to analyze how the 9 
incorporation of CCCS may affect general contractors’ present and future competitiveness 10 
through a case study in China. The paper analyzes the procurement of 158 building projects 11 
tendered in Beijing, involving 2071 local general contractors active in the market. The results 12 
show that (1) the contractors’ CCCS scores are important for being awarded large and mega 13 
project contracts; (2) CCCS scores have a generally positive effect on future corporate financial 14 
income; and (3) that, contrary to expectations, the policy does not increase the CCCS of 15 
companies. Finally, it is observed how the changing trend in contractors’ CCCS scores is highly 16 
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correlated with their initial values (the scores of higher CCCS scoring companies increase 17 
faster on average than other companies). Final remarks concern ways to better implement 18 
CCCS schemes in the future and avoid the potential risks involved in their use. 19 
 20 
Keywords: Credit scoring, project procurement, construction contractor, policy evaluation, 21 
China.  22 
 23 
Introduction 24 
Governments worldwide consume many resources, goods and services, and 25 
governmental expenditure accounts for a large portion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 26 
Being ethical and transparent as well as pursuing principles such as efficiency, competition, 27 
value for money (VFM) and industrial development is the key for successful public 28 
procurement (Raymond 2008). However, corruption and collusion are serious problems in 29 
many developing countries due to poverty and weak law enforcement (Nwabuzor 2005).  30 
To help improve the situation in Beijing, a construction contractor credit scoring (CCCS) 31 
scheme evaluating the credibility and compliance of construction contractors was firstly 32 
launched by the local government in 2013. However, even though the Beijing CCCS scheme 33 
has been gradually adopted by other provincial governments in China, its impact on contractor 34 
selection and project procurement has not yet been tested empirically. As is common practice 35 
in China today, phased policy initiation and closely evaluated pilot schemes are to be conducted 36 
before large-scale implementation to reduce risks and improve further implementations 37 
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(Swanson & Bhadwal 2009). It is particularly important, therefore, to compare the policy goals 38 
with the results actually achieved (Nakamura 1987). 39 
Towards this end, this article aims to gauge the impact of CCCS on project procurement 40 
and construction contractors at the initial stages of implementation. The development of 41 
construction project procurement in China is firstly reviewed and the recently incorporated 42 
CCCS project procurement policy introduced. Aiming to disclose the impact of applying CCCS 43 
scores in construction project procurement, the process of developing and applying this new 44 
public policy is next reviewed. The research questions to be answered are then posed: How do 45 
the CCCS scores affect contract competition? What is the relationship between the new policy 46 
and changes in corporate income? and How do CCCS scores change over time? Discussions 47 
are further developed to help policy implementation on a larger scale and benefit potential 48 
applications in other countries. 49 
 50 
Literature Review 51 
Public Procurement Policy 52 
The procurement stage of public projects is the most commonly affected by unethical 53 
and illicit practices. This has led to calls for improved procurement practices in both developed 54 
and developing countries (Tow and Loosemore 2009). As an antidote to these problems, 55 
alternative ranking and scoring rules, including the average bid method (Ioannou and Leu 1993) 56 
and below-average bid method (Ioannou & Awwad 2010), have been increasingly applied in 57 
some countries (see Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2015a for a recent and comprehensive taxonomy). 58 
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In addition to price, it is often advocated that other issues including schedule, safety, 59 
and management ability should be assessed in contractor selection as well as prequalification 60 
(e.g., Hatush and Skitmore 1998). Likewise, appropriate measures of corporate credit reflected 61 
in corporate compliance and previous performance on projects and contract implementation 62 
are said to be critical (Drew and Skitmore 1992; Shen and Song 1998; Shen et al. 2004), this 63 
being the reason why multi-attribute tender evaluation has been gaining popularity in recent 64 
years (Ye et al. 2012).  65 
It is also important that public procurement should be concerned with issues affecting 66 
disadvantaged groups. For example, Walker and Preuss (2008) examined opportunities for 67 
enhancing sustainability in supply chains by sourcing from small and medium-sized enterprises 68 
(SMEs) in health care and local government. This is important because “SMEs are more 69 
innovative and come up with new products, but are often taken over by big suppliers who end 70 
up deciding what you should have” (Walker and Preuss 2008, p20). 71 
In the UK, for example, the Government Sustainable Development Strategy requires 72 
local governments to embed sustainable development considerations into decisions on 73 
governmental spending and foster some changes on public procurement in local government 74 
(Preuss 2009). The priorities of public procurement should therefore be developed based on 75 
needs within the political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal 76 
background (e.g., Bekkers et al. 2011). Integrity and accountability for the use of public money 77 
needs to be emphasized as well as the expectation of high levels of credibility among 78 
participating companies and governmental officials. The policy examined in this study is an 79 
attempt at incorporating such credibility into public procurement policy. 80 
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  81 
The Situation in China  82 
Since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, there has been a wide expectation 83 
that China will assume much more responsibility in the international market and maintain 84 
improved ethical norms in both Chinese society and business collaborators worldwide (Tam 85 
2002). In pursuance of this, many administrative authorities have issued policies and 86 
regulations to assure the compliance of companies. For example, China’s 2005 Company Law 87 
(Lin 2010) legislates that companies should respect laws, social morality and trade honesty, as 88 
well as assuming an exemplary level of social responsibility. Subsequently, in 2008, the State 89 
Council issued the Guidelines on Corporate Social Responsibility Fulfilment for State-Owned 90 
Enterprises in China, requiring all state-owned enterprises to actively guarantee social 91 
responsibility in terms of awareness, implementation, business credits, prudent use of resources 92 
and environmental protection.  93 
Within this context, Chinese construction contractors are becoming increasingly aware 94 
of the importance of corporate social responsibility and the nexus between corporate social 95 
performance and financial performance (Xiong et al. 2016). However, China’s construction 96 
industry has been dogged by scandals and tragedies for a long time. These have been mostly 97 
caused by low trade credit and poor quality construction work (Shaw 1997).  98 
As with many developing nations, the construction industry consumes a large amount 99 
of resources and energy, generally involving poor working conditions, frequent conflicts, and 100 
significantly negative impacts on the environment (Fenn et al. 1997; Lu and Tam 2013; Shen 101 
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and Tam 2002). There are also more than 40 million immigrant construction workers in China, 102 
many of whom are not paid on time (CBS 2013); this, along with China’s other structural 103 
problems and below-standard worker safety, has also contributed to a large number of 104 
casualties in the construction industry (Liu et al. 2011). The prevalence of corruption and 105 
collusive bidding are also another two well-known problems (Xiao 2014). 106 
Competitive bidding has been used in China since the early 1980s (Lai et al. 1998). 107 
Along with China’s economic transition to a market economy, the procurement of construction 108 
projects has changed from a negotiated awarding procedure, where only state-owned 109 
contractors were entitled to participate, to an open competitive tendering scheme (Shen and 110 
Song 1998). As defined in public procurement regulations by the Chinese Ministry of Finance 111 
(MOF 2004) and construction tender regulations issued by the National Development and 112 
Reform Commission (NDRC 2003), the procedures for construction project procurement 113 
generally comprise tender notice (invitation), submission, opening, evaluation, and selection.  114 
Construction contractors are divided into three main grades: general contractors, 115 
specialist contractors and labor contractors (MOC 2015). For general contractors, there is an 116 
additional grade of “Excellence” in addition to Grade 1, Grade 2, and Grade 3. Such grading 117 
reflects corporate capital, size and previous performance record (Shen et al. 2004) and is only 118 
required for tender notification and pre-qualification.  119 
Competition intensity in the national construction project market is very high (Ye et al. 120 
2008). Multi-criteria tender assessment methods are available in contractor selection, with bid 121 
evaluation used to measure whether bidders’ proposals meet client expectations. According to 122 
a survey by Shen and Song (1998), construction quality, schedule, and costs are the three most 123 
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important factors when deciding which company will win the auction. Additional factors 124 
including market conditions, payment arrangements, the number of competitors, and third-125 
party stakeholders have also been identified (Ye et al. 2012). Therefore, many tender evaluation 126 
criteria have proliferated over the years, with both quantitative and multicriteria approaches 127 
being applied (Lai et al. 2004; Shen et al. 2004). 128 
However, the main awarding criterion: the lowest price offered, is still widely used in 129 
China, as with many construction industries throughout the world (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 130 
2015b, 2016). As is well known, this economic awarding criterion does not guarantee that the 131 
final cost is necessarily the lowest (Wong et al. 2001). Given the highly competitive profile of 132 
China’s construction market (e.g., Cheah and Chew 2005), contractor selection using the lowest 133 
price often attracts unrealistically low bids. Bidders face the temptation of relinquishing the 134 
prospect of making a reasonable profit by legitimate means in order to be awarded a contract. 135 
Once awarded, they seek to obtain a profit through later changes and claims. Therefore, such a 136 
situation often causes future problems for both the owner and the contractor when claims arise 137 
over scope, costs, quality, and schedule disagreements (e.g., Ioannou and Leu 1993; Ye et al. 138 
2008).  139 
 140 
Construction Contractor Credit Scoring (CCCS) 141 
Credit scoring is the process of assigning a quantitative value to represent 142 
creditworthiness. It has become a popular theme in recent research and practice (Arya et al. 143 
2013). The scores are based on the statistical analysis of a person’s credit report and ability to 144 
repay potential loans (Arya et al. 2013). A variety of credit scoring models have been developed, 145 
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the most common of which in financial markets is the individual credit score developed by the 146 
Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) (Mayer et al. 2009). The FICO score has been used by many 147 
commercial banks to make loan decisions and to determine whether the borrower can be given 148 
a “prime rate” for having a satisfactory credit score. When house prices declined in the U.S. in 149 
2008, for instance, mortgage defaults rose sharply and were particularly concentrated among 150 
“subprime” borrowers with low FICO scores (Mayer et al. 2009).  151 
Credit scoring construction contractors provides an important means of helping avoid 152 
poor credit-related problems such as shoddy projects, chains of defaults, and corruption. 153 
Hatush and Skitmore’s (1997) Delphi interview studies, for example, found that credit status 154 
and reputation, as well as technical ability and management capability, were critical to 155 
successful contractor selection in prequalification and bidding. Similar to general credit scores 156 
at the individual and corporate level, contractor credit in the construction industry measures 157 
the willingness and likelihood of successfully completing a construction project (Liu and Zhu 158 
2006). However, there have been only a few studies of contractor credit scores, with Liu and 159 
Zhu (2006), for example, proposing a rough set method to assess the credit of contractors; and 160 
Tserng et al. (2010) using three option-based credit models to predict construction contractor 161 
defaults. 162 
Beijing, the capital of China, with 21.5 million residents and 2071 registered 163 
construction contractors, generates a huge demand for construction work. In recognition of the 164 
problems associated with lowest bid tendering, the Beijing Municipal Commission Housing 165 
and Urban-Rural Development (BMCHURD) and Beijing Municipal Commission of 166 
Development and Reform (BMCDR) issued their pilot policy Quantitative Tender Assessments 167 
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for Beijing Construction Projects, effective since the start of 2013. The change brought about 168 
by this policy was the launch of the CCCS scheme for contractors registered in Beijing and its 169 
use in later tender assessments to enhance the credibility and reputation of construction 170 
contractors and reflect the strong determination of the central government to improve the 171 
overall credit rating of the construction industry.  172 
Of particular relevance here is an amendment incorporating CCCS scores into the 173 
construction project procurement process in Beijing, which clearly envisions that "a company's 174 
market performance today will determine its market access and market share tomorrow". The 175 
policy involves CCCS scores rated by the government authority and used in both tenderer 176 
selection as an essential part of the current tendering evaluation system combining economic 177 
bid (EB) and technical bid (TB) scores. The intense competitive nature of Beijing’s construction 178 
industry means that construction contractors naturally are expected to seek a competitive 179 
advantage by improving their CCCS scores. 180 
Similarly to the FICO formula, the calculation of CCCS scores involves a complex 181 
process with assessments of organizational level information including contract information, 182 
technical progress, professional awards and corporate social responsibility. There is also 183 
project level information, with such items as general management, safety management, 184 
construction site management, quality management, contract management, HR management, 185 
and materials management, plus another 352 penalty items covering these aspects. 186 
The launch of a new policy in China usually comprises problem identification, policy 187 
initiation, implementation, and evaluation. Typical of the China Government approach, the 188 
large-scale implementation of new policies necessarily involves evaluated pilot studies and the 189 
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phased initiation of policy to help avoid risks and inform future policies (Swanson and Bhadwal 190 
2009). Timely evaluation of the impact of pilot studies is important in order to alert wrong 191 
decisions, guide future policy revisions and improvements, provide alternative approaches, and 192 
gain extra support for decision-makers (Weiss 1988).  193 
However, although the CCCS project procurement policy had the reasonable 194 
expectation that companies would perform better as a result, its actual effect on contractors - 195 
the main players in the construction market - have yet to be evaluated empirically. As 196 
commented in 2000 by Economics Nobel Laureate James Heckman, micro data including 197 
individual data and individual decision models are needed to test micro policy and provide a 198 
more credible description (Heckman 2001). Therefore, this article is aimed at providing an 199 
understanding of the effects of CCCS procurement by using quantitative analysis methods to 200 
analyze empirical evidence from real projects and companies in Beijing. 201 
 202 
Research Methods 203 
Data 204 
Detailed information of 158 high-rise residential construction projects tendered in 205 
Beijing during 2013 and the bidders' evaluation scores were collected from the Beijing 206 
Engineering Construction Trading Information Centre (BECTIC). These comprise 85.9% of 207 
all open bid housing projects in Beijing during 2013. To investigate the effects of CCCS 208 
procurement at the organizational level, the 2071 registered general construction contractors in 209 
Beijing are analyzed, with especial focus on the 175 with CCCS scores among the top 10%. 210 
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These 175 companies have total revenues amounting to 70% of the total construction 211 
expenditure in Beijing from 2011 to 2013. Key descriptions of the sample projects and sample 212 
companies are summarized in Table 1. 213 
<Insert Table 1 here> 214 
Analyses 215 
A twofold method of analysis is applied to both the project and organizational levels. 216 
Since CCCS policy aims to align a company' market performance with its market access and 217 
market share, the main focus of the analyses is to estimate the extent to which a company’s 218 
CCCS score affects its market access and prospects of winning contract auctions (Research 219 
question 1), increase its company income (Research question 2), and changes in its CCCS 220 
scores over time (Research question 3). To investigate these effects, quantitative analysis 221 
techniques including basic descriptive statistics, principal component regression, and latent 222 
variable growth modeling are applied. These are described here in terms of competitive 223 
measurement in project bidding, and evaluating the impact at the organizational level. 224 
 225 
Competitiveness measurement in bidding 226 
The economic bid (EB) score is determined by comparing the bid prices. Normally, 227 
the bid closest to the average bid receives the highest score. Technical bid (TB) scores are 228 
provided by five (or seven, if the project is large) industry experts according to an itemized 229 
questionnaire. The overall score of a bidder i for project j, Qij, is calculated by multiplying 230 
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the EB, TB, and CCCS scores of bidder i, that is  , , and  respectively, by the 231 
respective weights ( , and ) stated in the tender documents, such as: 232 
  (1) 233 
where the CCCS weights have four levels: 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% normally depending on 234 
the project size (small, medium, large, and mega) (BMCHURD and BMCDR 2012) as 235 
specified in Table 1. Therefore, firstly, a one-way ANOVA will be performed to test whether 236 
the CCCS scores differ between the groups formed by all bidders, the shortlisted bidders, and 237 
the winners. 238 
Secondly, we will also measure the contribution of the CCCS scores in determining 239 
the winners. For this purpose, the variable CCCS competitiveness (noted as ) 240 
measures the effect of CCCS scores between the winner and both second best and last ranked 241 
bidder, respectively, as: 242 
  (2) 243 
  (3) 244 
Similar statistics, including    and , are calculated to measure the 245 
competitiveness for EB and TB.  246 
Finally, considering the impact of project size, the Kruskal-Wallis test will also be 247 
applied to determine if statistics including ,     and 248 
 differ by project size. The Kruskal-Wallis test is a non-parametric test that compares 249 
the medians of two samples. It is also named the ‘one-way ANOVA on ranks’ which, unlike 250 
the latter, does not assume the residuals follow a Normal distribution.  251 
EB
ijS TBijS
CCCS
ijS
EB
jW
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EB EB TB TB CCCS CCCS
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Additionally, Wilcoxon signed rank tests will be used to demonstrate whether the null 252 
hypothesis (i.e., the medians of the paired differences equal zero) must be accepted or rejected 253 
for each project size (small, medium, large, and mega). Again, the Wilcoxon signed-rank non-254 
parametric test is an alternative to the paired Student’s t-test when the population cannot be 255 
assumed to be Normally distributed. All the results will be presented later in the Analysis and 256 
results section. 257 
 258 
Evaluating Impact at the Organizational Level 259 
Organizational level analyses are needed to link the CCCS scores and corporate 260 
income, as well as changes in the CCCS scores over time. The former will answer the second 261 
research question, that is, if the current CCCS scores determine the contractor’s market 262 
access. The latter will answer the third research question, that is, borrowing Beijing’s 263 
contracting authority words, if “a company's market performance today determines its market 264 
access and market share tomorrow”. 265 
Correlation analysis is firstly conducted to test the change in corporate income with 266 
the emergence of CCCS scores from 2012 to 2013, that is, just before and after the 267 
implementation of the new policy. If, as proposed in the second research question, the CCCS 268 
increases corporate income, there should be a positive correlation as a result. The regression 269 
expression is presented later but contains the following variables: values of construction 270 
contracts awarded in Beijing during 2013 (Y), values of construction contracts awarded in 271 
Beijing during 2012 (as X2), plus the contractor’s CCCS score (X1). 272 
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Additionally, a latent growth (curve) model (LGM) - a longitudinal design of structural 273 
equation modeling (SEM) - will be used to answer the third research question, that is, to 274 
examine the changes in CCCS scores over time. SEM is a common quasi-routine data mining 275 
approach used in social science studies (Xiong et al. 2015) and LGM in particular is used to 276 
measure the changing trend of some variables over time to reveal both intra-individual and 277 
inter-individual variability (MacCallum and Austin 2000). The advantages of LGM also 278 
include the ability (a) to provide conclusions at the aggregate level; (b) to model growth over 279 
time in linear or nonlinear trajectories; and (c) to use estimated parameters for later prediction 280 
(Walker et al. 1996). Aimed at understanding the average change and individual variation in 281 
changes, the application of LGM to longitudinal data assumes that each company has a specific 282 
intercept and changing slope (Peterson et al. 2011). 283 
Here, repeated measures of individual contractors’ CCCS scores across five periods are 284 
used in model development. Various statistics, including Chi-square (χ2), root mean square 285 
error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 286 
will also be used to assess the model’s goodness of fit, as detailed later. 287 
 288 
Analyses and Results 289 
Competitiveness measurement in bidding 290 
The usual Beijing project procurement practice, even in open tendering, is to shortlist 291 
no more than seven bidders. This is verified in the sample, where this occurred in 145 out of 292 
the 158 auctions involved. In addition, there are 2071 registered general contractors in the 293 
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Beijing construction market, with 175 having CCCS scores higher than 67.71 (out of 100). As 294 
shown in Table 2, companies with higher CCCS scores account for a larger proportion of 295 
selected bidders and winners.  296 
<Insert Table 2 here> 297 
With median CCCS scores of 80.91 and 83.55, the shortlisted bidders and winners are 298 
clearly higher than the 50.5 of the 2071 companies as a whole. This is confirmed by a Kruskal-299 
Wallis test with p<0.001 (χ2df=2 =1364.51). Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, that is, 300 
the medians of all the groups’ (i.e. general contractors, shortlisted bidders and winners) CCCS 301 
scores are not equal. The CCCS score has therefore proven its effectiveness in narrowing 302 
market access to insufficiently scored construction companies. 303 
Next, the top of Table 3 gives the descriptions of the EB, TB, and CCCS weights for 304 
the 158 sample auctions and related competitiveness measurement statistics.  305 
<Insert Table 3 here> 306 
Kruskal-Wallis tests are firstly applied to determine if the statistics  307 
 ,  ,  , and  differ by project size. It is found that only 308 
 (with p=0.028), (with p=0.0012) and  (with p=0.039) barely reject the 309 
null hypothesis (for a=0.001, despite still below 0.05). This means the latter three statistics 310 
need to be analyzed by project size (as in Table 3). 311 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are then used to test , , and  by 312 
different project size groups, as well as the overall  , and  statistics. 313 
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With only two cases (N=2), the data subset of small projects is not used for the Wilcoxon 314 
test. 315 
The results from Table 3 suggest that (a) the median of  is not significantly 316 
different from zero (p=0.393); (b) the median of  between the medium size projects 317 
is not significantly different from zero (p=0.470) eitherbut medians of  between 318 
the large and mega projects are significantly larger than zero; and (c) despite differences 319 
across project size groups, the medians of , ,  and  are significantly 320 
larger than zero. This indicates that few bidders win a contract solely because of their higher 321 
CCCS scores. However, bidders with low CCCS scores are unlikely to win large and mega 322 
projects, meeting the expectations of the policy (that CCCS scores are important in tender 323 
assessment). On the other hand, and as probably expected, EB and TB, being always 324 
significant, have a larger impact on the final contract award. 325 
 326 
Evaluating Impact at the Organizational Level 327 
Based on results of the correlation analyses, it is reasonable to try to predict the 328 
corporate income of company i in 2013 (Y) from the previous records of the company in 2012 329 
(X2) and its CCCS scores (X1) via the equation Y= a+ b1X1+ b2*X2.  330 
Applying multiple linear regression produces a condition index (CI) > 30 and a variance 331 
proportion larger than 0.5, indicating that collinearity is likely to have a distorting effect. To 332 
avoid this bias, principal component regression is used to obtain the corrected coefficients (see 333 
Liu et al. 2003, for further details). This produces 334 
1CCCS
jC
-
2CCCS
jC
-
2CCCS
jC
-
1EB
jC
- 2EB
jC
- 1TB
jC
- 2TB
jC
-
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 (4) 335 
with R2=0.65. This indicates that corporate good behavior may be tacit knowledge when clients 336 
were selecting contractors before the enforcement of the new policy. 337 
Considering that the overall corporate income increase for contractors with the highest 338 
CCCS scores from 2012 to 2013 is approximately the difference between 339 
 and (that is, CNY 52.62 billion) 340 
the effects of the CCCS scores seem to be clearly influential. This is confirmed by the 341 
significant positive correlation of X1 with the CCCS scores (p<0.001). However, the X2 slope 342 
is not significant (p=0.224). These results indicate that the CCCS scores are likely to become 343 
an independent factor contributing to corporate income, different from the factors describing 344 
previous corporate incomes. 345 
Finally, repeated measures of individual contractors’ CCCS scores are used across five 346 
periods: the middle of 2013, the end of 2013, the middle of 2014, the end of 2014, and the 347 
middle of 2015, named CCCS13Mid, CCCS13End, CCCS14Mid, CCCS14End, and 348 
CCCS15Mid respectively. Table 4 summarizes descriptions of the CCCS scores at these points 349 
and the correlations of 169 of the 175 (96.6%) contractors after deleting cases with missing 350 
data. It is also worth highlighting that normality of the data is an important assumption when 351 
applying the default maximum likelihood estimation method in LGM. For this purpose, it is 352 
generally sufficient for the sample skewness and excess kurtosis range to be within [-1, 1] 353 
(Xiong et al. 2015). As presented in Table 4, this is the case for the five variables. 354 
<Insert Table 4 here> 355 
1 28,988,692,233.544 120,325,609.947 0.539Y X X= - + +
175
1
CNY 251.53 billion
i
Y
=
=å
175
2
1
CNY198.91billion
i
X
=
=å
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Next, the latent growth model (LGM) as shown in Figure 1 was developed with AMOS 356 
21.0 software. The LGM goodness of fit, as described earlier, requires the following conditions 357 
to be checked (King and McInerney 2014): Chi-square (χ2 preferably with p<0.05, but at least 358 
with p<0.10), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA<0.08), comparative fit 359 
index (CFI>0.9), and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI>0.9). All conditions are met, with 360 
χ2(df=4)=7.868 (p=0.097), CFI=0.997, TLI=0.992, and RMSEA=0.076, suggesting a sufficient 361 
model fit. With this verification, it is then acceptable to use the proposed LGM to describe the 362 
changes in the companies’ CCCS scores over time. Coefficients of determination (R2) ranging 363 
from 0.740 to 0.934 of the five variables also indicate that a satisfactory amount of variance is 364 
explained. 365 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 366 
Finally, according to the results shown in Table 5, the average initial CCCS score of 367 
the companies in the middle of 2013 was 80.124 (46.748 variance), with an average slope of  368 
-1.079 (5.987 variance). After conducting a standard transformation, the distribution of the 369 
slope values indicate that 32.96% of the companies have a positive slope (increasing CCCS 370 
trend) while 67.04% companies have a negative slope (i.e. decreasing CCCS trend) over the 371 
five time periods. The significant covariance (p=0.05»a) between the intercept and slope 372 
indicates that companies with higher intercepts have larger slopes on average. 373 
<Insert Table 5 here> 374 
 375 
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Findings and Discussion 376 
The theoretical and practical implications concerning the impact of Beijing’s new 377 
policy are discussed in the following subsections. 378 
 379 
Are CCCS Scores Important for Winning a Contract? 380 
The CCCS scheme was launched by the government to monitor and enhance the 381 
performance of contractors. The practice of incorporating the CCCS scores into the bid 382 
evaluation process, as required in Beijing’s new procurement policy, is intended to push 383 
companies into increasing their corporate credit ratings to avoid being disadvantaged against 384 
their competitors. As presented in the analysis section, the two aspects linking policy and 385 
projects are particularly explored in terms of tender access and bidding competitiveness. For 386 
access, it is found that companies with higher CCCS scores are most likely to be shortlisted as 387 
bidders. This is supported by previous studies of prequalification criteria, where corporate 388 
credit and reputation are held to be a major concern (Hatush and Skitmore 1997; Shen and 389 
Song 1998; Shen et al. 2004).  390 
The tender assessment of Beijing projects is further evaluated to gauge the impact of 391 
CCCS scores on bidder competitiveness, indicating that contractors with the lowest CCCS 392 
scores are unlikely to be awarded contracts for large and mega projects, while the competition 393 
between the winner and the second best candidate are mainly determined by price and technical 394 
soundness. Therefore, this new policy should eliminate unreliable candidates and make the 395 
competition among reliable candidates focus on preparing for projects. This indicates that the 396 
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weights allocated to CCCS scores by BMCHURD & BMCDR (2012) for large and mega 397 
projects are appropriate. However, the insignificant competitiveness difference in CCCS scores 398 
has also been found in medium size projects. This could be the consequence of too small 399 
weights being allocated to the CCCS scores for this type of project. 400 
In this regard, the manipulation of credit scores is also a major concern in previous 401 
research (Mayer et al. 2009) and the appropriate sizing of these weights should avoid this. The 402 
CCCS for large and mega projects were important but not overemphasized, while the CCCS 403 
for medium projects should probably have to be revised if the CCCS component wants to be 404 
minimally emphasized.  405 
 406 
What is the Impact of CCCS Scores on Corporate Income? 407 
In addition to the examination of CCCS scores at the project level, an exploration at the 408 
organizational level is also conducted. Acknowledging the importance of corporate credit in 409 
contractor selection, the scheme makes quantitatively explicit what was originally a tacit rule: 410 
"a company's market performance today will determine its market access and market share 411 
tomorrow". Correlation and regression analyses indicate that the newly emerged CCCS scores 412 
contributed to corporate income change between 2012 and 2013. The large coefficient of the 413 
CCCS in Equation (4) indicates that corporate credit significantly affects corporate income, as 414 
only highly CCCS scored bidders are being shortlisted and eventually awarded contracts. 415 
Additionally, it would be interesting to know whether Beijing’s CCCS scheme affects 416 
later project performance (delays, quality, safety or cost issues, for instance). The data required 417 
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to answer this question are not generally published by the Chinese government, nor are they 418 
easily shared by the contractors. However, items describing satisfactory past execution 419 
performance are assessed when updating the contractors’ CCCS scores. This means that, to 420 
remain competitive and being shortlisted for future tenders, a contractor needs to perform 421 
consistently according to expectations. This safeguard is another point in favor of the credit 422 
scoring policy. 423 
Therefore, although well known for its poor quality and low trust inter-organizational 424 
relationships, the construction industry is becoming highly demanding of trust-based 425 
collaboration and higher ethical standards (Wood et al. 2002). The analysis results show that 426 
appropriate ethical standards emphasizing corporate credit have been achieved over time, 427 
despite the prevalent lack of trust and credit in China after its sudden economic transformation. 428 
This is also consistent with Xiong et al.’s (2016) longitudinal study finding a virtuous nexus 429 
between construction enterprises financial performance and their corporate social 430 
responsibility in China. Additionally, it is already rooted in China’s ubiquitous Confucius 431 
culture of “using proper ways to riches and honor” and “seeing profits as well as rightness”, as 432 
in the Analects.  433 
 434 
How CCCS Scores Change Over Time? 435 
In many cases, the instruments of public policy are not neutral and unexpected effects 436 
are common in their implementation. A public policy may incentivize some and penalize others 437 
(Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007). Therefore, the different effects of the new project 438 
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procurement policy need to be considered carefully. The policy takes for granted that it can 439 
improve corporate credit since, as reported in the mass media, it is instrumental in determining 440 
corporate income (Wang and Yu 2012). However, the results of the latent growth model do not 441 
support this assumption. This might be attributed to the short observation period and 442 
inconsistency of the selected contractors. In the latter case, it is found that contractors with 443 
higher initial CCCS scores always enjoy faster increases in their CCCS scores, while 444 
contractors with lower initial CCCS scores may face a slower increase or faster decrease in 445 
their CCCS scores.  446 
In the long run, these companies may face a polarized situation. One the one hand, 447 
contractors with high corporate credit faces the virtuous nexus between corporate social 448 
performance and financial performance. Companies with better financial performance can 449 
allocate more resources (defined as “slack resources”) to socially responsible activities, which 450 
ultimately increase financial performance for gaining even more competitive advantage 451 
(Waddock and Graves 1997; Xiong et al. 2016). Companies with lower corporate credit, on the 452 
other hand, can fall into Porter and Kramer’s (2011) “vicious circle” between business and 453 
society. Therefore, a major concern is how to inspire companies with lower corporate credit to 454 
change and improve their future performance.  455 
 456 
Conclusions 457 
Trustworthiness and corruption have long been major causes of concern in the Chinese 458 
construction industry, and the Chinese government’s construction contractor credit scoring 459 
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(CCCS) scheme in Beijing is intended to address these problems. The scheme aims to evaluate 460 
the compliance and integrity of firms registered as contractors in the construction market. 461 
However, it is unclear if and how well this scheme is working, as well as its side effects on 462 
local contractors. 463 
Through the procurement of 158 building projects in Beijing, involving 2071 local 464 
general contractors, this paper analyzes the scheme’s effects on the contractors’ 465 
competitiveness after its implementation in 2013. In particular, the findings show that (1) the 466 
contractors’ CCCS scores are important for their selection for bidding and being awarded 467 
contracts for large and mega projects; (2) the CCCS scores have a generally positive effect on 468 
corporate financial income; and (3) unexpectedly, the policy does not increase the CCCS of 469 
companies. The changing trend in CCCS scores is also associated with their initial values, since 470 
the scores of higher CCCS scoring companies increase faster on average than other companies. 471 
The important implications for project management and project procurement are that 472 
the incorporation of explicit CCCS scores is useful for selecting more reliable contractors. The 473 
implementation of this new policy is expected to help in creating shared value by maximizing 474 
economic and social benefits for both contractors and government. However, construction 475 
companies need time to recognize the role of the CCCS scores in awarding contracts and take 476 
action to seek competitive advantage by improving their CCCS scores over time. Considering 477 
the high level of competition in the Chinese construction industry, it is reasonable to expect 478 
that many companies with initially low CCCS scores will try to secure more contracts by 479 
increasing their corporate credit.  480 
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The main limitation of this study is that the empirical evidence covered only 175 large 481 
general contractors between 2013 and 2015. Future data collection may require a different 482 
approach depending on the questions to be answered. For example, further research is needed 483 
to investigate the visibility of contractor credit scores and risks such as credit score 484 
manipulation. The visibility of contractor credit scores could lower the information asymmetry 485 
between clients and contractors, improve public supervision, and improve the ethical behavior 486 
of contractors in the face of social pressure and competitive forces.  487 
Furthermore, the risks associated with the implementation of this new policy should 488 
also not be ignored. For example, the CCCS weight also needs to be appropriate. If the weight 489 
is too low, corporate credit does not affect the contract award, as was the case for medium size 490 
projects. On the other hand, if the weight is too high, corporate credit may be overemphasized, 491 
so that a contractor could earn a project by its reputation rather than by sound preparation for 492 
a specific project. Finally, the overemphasis of corporate credit may lead to the manipulation 493 
of credit scoring. For the implementation phase, it is important that contractors have sufficient 494 
time and resources to make changes to improve their performance, and further research is 495 
needed to ensure that this is fully taken into account. The outcomes of this study also have 496 
particular implications for many other developing countries struggling with corruption and 497 
pursuing higher standards in public procurement, in providing a head start to contractors whose 498 
ethical behavior and past performance have been satisfactory. 499 
 500 
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Table 1. Data summary of the sample projects and companies 647 
Sample Group Size (106 CNY) Frequency % Mean value St. Dev. 
158 
Projects  
Small Less than 30 2 1.3 19.24 1.79 
Medium 30-100 56 35.4 60.94 19.26 
Large 100-300 72 45.6 169.91 55.61 
Mega Greater than 300 28 17.7 442.28 180.4 
  Total 158 100 177.65 157.54 
175 
contractors 
Grades 
Excellent 63 36 / / 
Grade 1 105 60 / / 
Grade 2 7 4 / / 
Avg. 
income 
2011-13    
Less than 100 8 4.57 74.61 31.11 
100-1000 124 70.86 469.02 240.75 
Greater than 1000 43 24.57 2394.85 1641.69 
Total 175 100 924.19 1186.12 
Note: 1 USD=6.69 CNY on 17 July 2018.  648 
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Table 2. CCCS scores related to market access and market share at the project level. 649 
CCCS scores 2071 companies 782 shortlisted bidders in 158 contracts  
Winners of 158 
contracts 
Range 33.00 - 96.71 44.50 - 96.71 46.50 - 96.71 
Mean (95% CI) 54.75 (54.37, 55.15) 78.40 (77.48, 79.28) 80.50 (78.43, 82.47) 
SD (95% CI) 9.14 (8.634, 9.655) 12.66 (12.064, 13.20) 13.09 (11.64, 14.31) 
Mode 50 50.50 73.17 
Median 50.5 80.91 83.55 
>67.71 175 (8.45%) 625 (79.95%) 134 (84.81%) 
<=67.71 1896 (91.55%) 157 (20.05%) 24 (15.19%) 
Note: 782 shortlisted bidders and 158 winners are calculated by direct count, that is, the same 650 
company may have been shortlisted or winner several times.  651 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and competitiveness measurement statistics of project weights  652 
Type N Min Max Mean St. Dev. 
Significance of 
Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests 
EB weight 158 0.48 0.90 0.537 0.056 / 
TB weight 158 0.00 0.90 0.330 0.053 / 
CCCS weight 158 0.05 0.20 0.132 0.029 / 
 158 -1.490 9.000 3.919 2.164 / 
 small 2 6.000 6.330 6.167 0.235 - 
medium 56 -1.490 9.000 4.218 2.100 *** 
large 73 -6.550 5.950 1.114 2.220 *** 
mega 27 0.000 7.650 3.241 2.086 *** 
 158 -2.040 20.400 6.559 4.288 / 
 small 2 6.000 6.330 6.167 0.235 - 
medium 56 -1.490 9.000 4.218 2.100 *** 
large 73 -2.040 20.400 5.904 3.919 *** 
mega 27 0.000 7.650 3.241 2.086 *** 
 158 -4.330 14.400 4.358 2.400 *** 
 158 -3.170 14.000 5.455 2.610 *** 
 158 -5.610 4.900 0.115 1.788 0.393 
 158 -6.550 8.830 0.925 2.376 / 
small 2 -2.700 -0.390 -1.543 1.630 / 
medium 56 -4.130 5.990 0.138 1.817 0.470 
large 73 -6.550  5.950  1.114  2.220 *** 
mega 27 -5.190  8.830  2.230  3.113 *** 
Note: *** indicates significant with p<0.001. “/” indicates that the statistic was not submitted 653 
to the Wilcoxon signed rank test. “-“ indicates that the statistic was not submitted to the 654 
Wilcoxon signed rank test because of insufficient sample size.  655 
1EB
jC
-
2EB
jC
-
1TB
jC
-
2TB
jC
-
1CCCS
jC
-
2CCCS
jC
-
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and correlations for corporate credit scores during 2013-2015 656 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Correlation 
1 2 3 4 
1.CCCS13Mid 79.981 7.685 0.353 -0.786     
2. CCCS13End 79.840 8.631 -0.189 0.151 0.919    
3. CCCS14Mid 79.016 9.692 -0.215 -0.591 0.859 0.862   
4. CCCS14End 78.636 9.709 -0.362 -0.67 0.789 0.818 0.882  
5. CCCS15Mid 77.505 10.803 -0.502 -0.361 0.740 0.773 0.828 0.934 
Note: N=169, all correlations are significant with p<0.001.  657 
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Table 5. LGM parameter estimates 658 
Variables Estimate (E) 
Standard Error 
(SE) 
Crit. Ratio 
(CR=E/SE) p-value 
CCCS Intercept 80.124 0.582 137.613 *** 
CCCS Slope -1.079 0.271 -3.976 *** 
Intercept-slope Covariance 7.917 4.035 1.962 0.05 
Note: *** indicates significant with p<0.001. 659 
 Fig. 1. Latent Growth Model measuring CCCS scores variations over time  
(Numbers on the arrows are proposed loadings, for example  
CCCS2013End = 1*CCCSintercept + 0.5*CCCSslope + error) 
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